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Abstract 
 
The literature on the political business cycle (PBC) suggests that politicians systematically manipulate 
economic conditions in order to increase their chances of re-election. The list of variables that have 
been found to have a significant effect on the probability of re-election includes macroeconomic 
(inflation rate, unemployment rate, output growth rate) and fiscal (budget balance, level of 
expenditures and tax revenues) outcomes. This paper focuses on the question whether price and non-
price competitiveness indicators together with consumer confidence index have a statistically 
significant effect. Thus, this paper addresses two empirical questions. First, in light of the globalisation 
process and on-going comparisons among national economies, could price and non-price indicators 
serve as a proxy for voters when deciding on whether to penalise or reward the incumbent? And 
second, based on the economic theory of voting, is consumer confidence index a better indicator of re-
election probability compared to unemployment and output growth rates? Using a dataset of EU 
member states over the 2000-2015 period and by applying probit/logit analysis we test both questions.    
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Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to empirically investigate the relationship between voters and 
incumbents in 28 EU member states over the 2000-2015 period. We do this by taking into 
account economic outcomes, consumer sentiments and on-going comparisons among national 
economies in election years. Thus this paper is holistic by nature, since it is combines 
economics (macroeconomic outcomes and concepts) and political science (analysis of 
election results) in political economic analysis on how voters cast their vote. Also, we use 
sociology inputs on the role of the voters in the political process and every day economic life.  
Political literature presents voters as the main actors in the election process, while in 
sociology we can see that voters are modeled as “temporary” politicians primarily through 
their impact on public policies (Weber, 1946). In new political economy literature (Persson 
and Tabellini, 2000) they are assumed to be rational and self-interested individuals 
comparable to consumers in private markets. However, we can distinguish among three 
different types of voters: reliable (constant), pivotal and new (Key, 1966). Since new voters 
are rather a rare breed, we focus on the pivotal voters who are responsible for removing 
incumbents out of the office and show learning abilities during electoral cycles. The existing 
research provides substantial evidence that voting patterns are in a certain sense determined 
by the state of the economy (de Haan, 2013).  
In a nutshell, the paper is trying to determine what makes voters’ react during election years 
by broadening the list of possible variables. We add to the existing literature in the following 
manner. First, by investigating whether the assumptions of the economic theory of voting 
apply in the whole of the EU28. This is especially important since EU now includes both new 
and old democracies – based on Brender-Drazen (2004) dichotomy – but also countries that 
have been divided on centre, semi-periphery and periphery during the Great Reccesion in 
addition to the initial divide between Eurozone members and other regular EU member states 
(that do not have a single monetary policy and euro as a currency). Second, we include widely 
used consumer confidence index together with price and non-price indicators that are highly 
debated among researchers and public due to array of competitiveness rankings. By doing this 
we are testing whether alternative measures of economic wellbeing can be used as a proxy for 
incumbents’ re-election. Thirdly, we are trying to establish whether consumer confidence 
index can serve as a better indicator of re-election probabilities which could have a significant 
effect due to its monthly availability.  
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents literature review, while section 3 
describes the methodology. Section 4 discusses the data sources and the empirical results. 
Finally, section 5 contains the conclusion   
 
Literature review 
In political economy literature since 1970s the impact of the economy on election results has 
received wide theoretical and empirical attention (Drazen, 2000) and it is still the most fluent 
and productive part of the field.  Political business cycle (PBC) theory suggests that 
politicians systematically manipulate economic conditions in order to increase their chances 
of re-election (Drazen, 2000, 2008, 2008a; Persson and Tabellini, 2000). They either use 
macroeconomic variables (growth, inflation and unemployment rates) or fiscal variables
1
 
(budget balances, level and/or structure of government expenditures and tax revenues, public 
debt).  
Prior to the emergence of PBC theory the government was considered, in economic models, 
to be a social planner that is solely responsible for maximizing a social welfare function. 
Also, it was assumed that maximizing this function coincides with the utility function of the 
so called representative agent in the economy. Further, the theory stipulates that governments 
are either driven by private interest and care only about their reelection prospects or are driven 
by partisan interest and thus during term are creating cycles in macroeconomic and fiscal 
variables. In the first case we are labeling cycles as opportunistic PBCs and in the second as 
partisan PBCs (Drazen, 2000; Drazen, 2008a; de Haan, 2013, Dubois, 2016). We focus on the 
first class of models – opportunistic PBCs as well on the assumption of rational voters that are 
pivotal based on Key’s (1996) classification.
2
 
The existing empirical evidence supports the view that benign economic conditions help 
incumbents stay in office (Frey and Schneider, 1978; Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya, 2004, 
Drazen and Eslava, 2010; Klomp and de Haan, 2013). Papers cover both parliamentary and 
presidential elections all over the world, and are also focused on local and national elections. 
On the local level in Israel (Brender, 2003), Russia (Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya, 2004), 
Portugal (Aidt et al., 2011), Columbia (Drazen and Eslava, 2010) and Argentina (Jones et al., 
                                                                        
1
 If this is the case some authors classify these cycles as political budget cycles (Drazen, 2008; Mačkić, 2014; 
Dubois, 2016). 
2
 The paper focuses on rational models of PBCs that incorporate cycles in outcomes and cycles in instruments. 
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2012) economic theory of voting was confirmed in the sense that opportunistic model of PBC 
resulted in incumbents reelection
3
. Pelzman’s (1992) research in the USA looked at the 
presidential, governor and senator elections and actually indicated that voters’ dislike 
opportunistic incumbents who manipulate fiscal policy instruments in the election period 
which is at odds with Frey and Schneiders’ (1978) conclusion that looks at the 
macroeconomic outcomes for the USA. On the national level, Brender and Drazen (2008) 
provide evidence for the opportunistic PBC and increased re-election possibilities while in the 
sample of “new” democracies while Klomp and de Haan (2013) provide it regardless of the 
maturity of the democracy. It is important to differentiate among the methodology, since 
Brender and Drazen use logit models and Klomp and de Haan linear panel models. 
Finally, many scholars have emphasized that the context plays an important role in creating 
PBCs and in determining electoral effects through opportunistic manipulation of economic 
outcomes. These include political alignment or affiliation (i.e., when local and national 
executives belong to the same party), the strength of political parties and the strength of the 
incumbent government, a divided or fragmented government being less able to generate a 
PBC because of coordination costs (Persson and Tabelini, 2000; Drazen, 2008; Drazen, 
2008a; Klomp and de Haan 2013, Dubois, 2016). Since we focus exclusively on the election 
outcomes we have disregarded these context issues and focused on the empirical validation of 
our additional variables through probit and logit estimates in the panel data settings.  
 
Methodology 
To test whether creating PBCs helps incumbents’ get re-elected we estimate how the 
probability of winning depends on the cycle magnitude. In order to do that we use non-linear 
panel data models, namely logit and probit models. Logit or logistic regression represents a 
special form of regression analysis in which the independent variable is binary (taking the 
value of 1 or 0).
4
 We model the probability as a function:  
                                                                        
3
 Arvate et al (2009) provide evidence that voters are conservatives that actually remove incumbents who create 
budget deficits in election periods, thus indicating that the level of sophistication among voters is a decisive 
determinant.  
4
 Out of the three different types of models with a binary independent variable: LPM (linear probability model), 
logit and probit model we exclude the LPM since it assumes that the response probability is linear in a set of 
parameters 𝛽𝑗. 
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𝑃(𝑦 = 1 𝐼 𝑥) =  𝐺(𝑏0 +  xb) (1)  
where 0<G(z)<1. One choice for G(z) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function:  




/2). This case is 
referred to as a probit model, while another common choice for G(z) is the logistic function, 
which is the cumulative distribution function for a standard logistic random variable: G(z) = 
exp(z)/[1 + exp(z)] = L(z). This case is referred to as a logit model. Both the probit and logit 
are nonlinear and require maximum likelihood estimation. 
The following equation is estimated: 
𝑃(𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1) =   𝜇0 +  𝜇1𝐶𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑡 +  𝜇2𝐺𝑉𝑇_𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑡  +  𝜇3𝑈𝐿𝐶_𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑡
+  𝜇4𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇5𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑡 +  𝜇6𝐵𝑈𝐷𝐺𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇7𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡, 𝑖 = 1, … 𝑁, 𝑡 = 1, … 𝑇 
(2)  
for probit random effects and logit random and fixed effects model. The data and results are 
presented in the next part of the paper. 
  
Findings 
Table 1 below shows descriptive statistics for our dependent variable re-election – REEL 
(taking the value of 1 if incumbents secured re-election and 0 otherwise) – and the remaining 
seven independent variables in the 2002-2015 time period for our sample of 28 European 
union member states. These are: consumer confidence index – CCI – collected from Eurostat, 
government efficiency – GVT_EFFECTIVENESS – part of World Bank’s Worldwide 
Governance Indicator, real unit labour costs – ULC_REAL – collected from AMECO 
database of European Commission, a dummy variable crisis – CRISIS – taking the value 0 
from 2000-2008 and 2014-2015 periods, and unemployment (UNEM) and real GDP growth 
(GROWTH) rate collected from Eurostat, which was also the source for the budget balance of 
the general government (BUDGET). 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics  
 
Source: Eurostat, World Bank, AMECO  
As indicated in the Table 2 both price (ULC_REAL) and non-price 
(GVT_EFFECTIVENESS) competitiveness indicators significantly influence reelection 
prospects of incumbents’, while consumer confidence indicator (CCI) is not statistically 
significant. At first this is at odds since we expected that CCI would act as a leading indicator 
of related macroeconomic variables
5
, but since output growth is also not statistically 
significant the result is not so surprising in the end.  
In addition to price and non-price competitiveness indicators,  unemployment (UNEM), as the 
only control macroeconomic variable, also shows significant effect on reelection prospects 
thus confirming assumptions stated in PBC literature (Drazen, 2000, 2008a; Persson and 
Tabellini, 2000). The obtained results are robust since they have been estimated by non-linear 
panel analysis, i.e. probit and logit analysis, based on random and fixed effects models. All 




                                                                        
5
 Sorić et al (2013) report that Business and Consumer Surveys indicators (including CCI) are in all EU member 
states equally efficient and their predictive properties go as far as four quarters ahead. 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
REEL 448 0.415 0.493 0  1 
CCI 434 -14.993 17.351 -74.75 24.158 
GVT_EFFECTIVENESS 392 1.153 0.627 -0.435 2.357 
ULC_REAL 448 99.079 5.233 82.952 140.079 
UNEM 422 5.608 2.692 1.5 17.3 
GROWTH 447 2.320 3.745 -14.8 26.3 
BUDGET 446 -2.831 3.673 -32.1 6.9 
CRISIS 448 0.312 0.464 0 1 
E F Z G  W O R K I N G  P A P E R  S E R I E S                                     1 7 - 0 4  
 Page 9 of 12 
Table 2: Reelection and consumer confidence, price and non-price competitiveness indicators 
and macroeconomic outcomes 
  PROBIT_RE LOGIT_RE LOGIT_FE 
REEL CCI -0.006 -0.010 -0.020 
  (0.010) (0.016) (0.020) 
 GVT_EFFECTIVENESS 1.048 1.758 2.474 
  (0.303)*** (0.520)*** (0.989)** 
 ULC_REAL 0.050 0.084 0.091 
  (0.024)** (0.040)** (0.049)* 
 UNEM -0.087 -0.147 -0.223 
  (0.046)* (0.078)* (0.091)** 
 GROWTH -0.005 -0.008 -0.012 
  (0.031) (0.052) (0.057) 
 BUDGET 0.004 0.008 0.003 
  (0.029) (0.048) (0.052) 
 CRISIS -0.126 -0.199 -0.180 
  (0.191) (0.320) (0.329) 
 _cons -5.960 -10.056  
  (2.550)** (4.301)**  
lnsig2u _cons -1.043 -0.017  
  (0.479)** (0.489)  
N  371.0 371.0 319.0 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Source: Authors’ own calculation 
 
Table 3 shows marginal effects of estimated probit and logit models on our independent 
variable. They indicate that a rise in the perceived government effectiveness by the electorate 
results in an increase of the probability that the incumbent stays in the office. This is in line 
with the view that in the globalized world, where we experience competition not only among 
companies but also national economies, the key role is given to the state. It is actually the 
states responsibility to regulate economic activities and provide a stimulating business 
environment with a sole purpose of increasing national competitiveness. Thus the state is 
being viewed by the electorate as the so called competitive state (Cerny, 1997) and the 
incumbent that can increase the observed level of competitiveness will be adequately 
rewarded and vice versa.  
This conclusion goes in line with the negative marginal effect of the unemployment rate. As 
the less competitive economy loses its market share in the world market so does its 
unemployment level increases. In return voters’ punish incumbents based on the economic 
theory of voting in the competitive environment that has been provided by the globalization of 
the world market.   
Finally, a rise in an economy’s unit labor costs represents an increased reward for labor’s 
contribution to output. A positive sign in front of the estimated marginal effect indicates that 
voters’ use this indicator as a proxy for their disposable income in the international context. 
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Thus an increase in ULC_REAL results in the increased probability that incumbent stays in  
the office. As for the other two variables, the estimated marginal effects in probit and logit 
models with random effects are almost the same, while the effects are smallest in logit model 
with fixed effect estimates.  
 
Table 3: Marginal effects of consumer confidence, price and non-price competitiveness 
indicators and macroeconomic outcomes on probability of incumbents’ reelection  
  PROBIT_RE LOGIT_RE LOGIT_FE 
REEL CCI -0.002 -0.002 -3.01e-07 
  (0.003) (0.003) ** 
 GVT_EFFECTIVENESS 0.401 0.416 .000038 
  (0.115)*** (0.122)*** * 
 ULC_REAL 0.019 0.019 1.40e-06 
  (0.009)** (0.009)** ** 
 UNEM -0.034 -0.035 -3.42e-06 
  (0.017)* (0.018)*  
 GROWTH -0.002 -0.002 -1.81e-07 
  (0.012) (0.012)  
 BUDGET 0.002 0.002 4.66e-08 
  (0.011) (0.011)  
 CRISIS -0.048 -0.047 -2.84e-06 
  (0.072) (0.074)  
N  371.0 371.0 319.0 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Source: Authors’ own calculation 
 
Conclusion 
This paper addresses the question what do voters in EU28 reward at the polls. Namely, do 
they take into consideration price and non-price competitiveness indicators together with 
consumer confidence index when they cast their votes? We find no evidence that consumer 
confidence index influences the reelection probability of the incumbent. What we do report is 
that price and non-price indicators, namely real unit labor costs and government effectiveness, 
serve as a proxy for voters when deciding on whether to penalize or reward the incumbent. 
Our analysis indicates that voters use these two indicators and that there is a positive 
relationship between them and reelection probability. In the light of the globalization process 
and on-going comparisons among national economies this serves as proof that voters’ 
evaluate incumbents’ track record relative to the their peers in other countries and reward 
them accordingly. 
Our findings also indicate that unemployment is a better indicator of re-election probability 
compared to consumer confidence index. Thus, taking into consideration the positive effect of 
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the rise in the real unit labor costs and the negative effect of the unemployment rate we can 
conclude two things. First, the economic theory of voting applies to the whole of the EU28 
(both new and established democracies based on Brender-Drazen dichotomy) and second, 
traditional macroeconomic indicators still prevail when it comes to reelection probability. 
These results are consistent with the prediction of the political business cycle model and our 
analysis provides possibilities for further research that should focus on the context in which 
voters cast their votes, e.g. determine various voter sophistication levels among EU28. 
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